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ABSTRACT

Many different legal and non-legal institutions govern and
therefore shape knowledge production. It is tempting, given the
various types of knowledge, knowledge producers, and systems
with and within which knowledge and knowledge producers and
users interact, to look for reductionist shortcuts-in general, but
especially in the context of comparative institutional analysis. The
temptation should be resisted for it leads to either what Harold
Demsetz called the Nirvana Fallacy or what Elinor Ostrom
critiqued as myopic allegories.
One easy reductionist step is to focus on a particular
dilemma-a particular market failure, for example, ignoring or
assuming away others-and then compare institutions in terms of
effectiveness in resolving the dilemma. We might, for example,
want to use comparative institutional analysis to examine the
problem of pharmaceutical development. If we focus on
overcoming the potential undersupply of drugs (because they are
expensive to develop but cheap to copy), and ifwe identify the FDA
approval process (and specifically clinical trials) as the most
important cost driver, then we might compare as potential
responses patents and other institutions like prizes, grants, and
government provided infrastructure for clinical trials. We might
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then conclude that government funding of clinical trials is best
because it lowers the cost of bringing drugs to market and without
the deadweight loss associated with patents. That analysis might
be useful, as far as it goes, but it would ignore other market
failures, such as the demand-side failure that leads to
underprovisioning of drugs to smaller or nonexistent markets.
This is, of course, not to say that there is anything wrong with
comparing institutions as solutions to the clinical-trial cost
problem. But it is to emphasize that we can only design
institutions to address problems we recognize, and the risk of
myopia is strong in comparative institutional analysis. Engaging
in meaningful comparison seems to demand a reduction in the
scope of problems to which the institutions might be addressed,
lest the problem seem intractable.
We suggest that comparative institutional analysis must be
accompanied by comparative failure analysis, by which we mean
rigorous and contextual comparative analysis of the ways different
institutional responses fail. And we argue that several different
types of failures are relevant to comparative analysis. Some
failures originate at the system level-that is, market systems
exhibit certain sets of failures, while political/government and
community systems exhibit other sets. In terms of figuring out
what society wants (i.e., from the demand side), the systems rely
on different signals, information, processes, and so on. And in
terms of satisfying societal demand, the systems rely on different
actors, distribution methods, and relationships. Other types of
failures are system independent-they are a function of the
resources at issue or the nature of the problem to which the
institution is addressed. Institutional design can, of course,
exacerbate or ameliorate these failures, but it is useful to
understand their fundamental causes.
So as a starting place, we think comparative analysis should
account for characteristics that vary at the system level and shape
both failures and institutions--characteristics like demand
signaling processes, time horizons/discount rates, evaluative
criteria (for projects, investments, or innovation), and the basic
capabilities operative within different settings or systems.
Failures and institutions obviously don't correspond exactly, and
we suspect that comparative analysis of these and other
characteristics will provide guidance for continued comparative
analysis. We strongly believe that solid comparative analysis will
require both theoretical and empirical work, operating in tandem
rather than in isolation from each other. Comparative analysis is
necessarily contextual.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars engaged in comparative institutional analysis are
poised to make significant contributions in the field of intellectual
property, or more broadly, in information law and policy.
Empirical work continues to show significant variance in the need
for, and effect of, intellectual property and other innovationrelated laws and institutions-across industries, types of actors,
and contexts. 1 The best work going forward will necessarily
1.
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (arguing that
current patent law and institutions discourage innovation and investment); DAN L. BURK
& MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009)
(arguing that patent law is in crisis and proposing that courts solve the crisis by tailoring
patent law to suit the needs of different industries); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not
Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361

316

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:2

involve interdisciplinary collaboration, mixed methods, and
humility-the latter precisely because grand theories are unlikely
to be sufficiently context-sensitive.
We are already seeing this work blossom. Scholars have
performed comparative institutional analysis with respect to a
variety of innovation problems. One line of research has compared
different types of institutions for incentivizing innovation,
considering the respective benefits and drawbacks of patents,
prizes,2 tax incentives, 3 and grants. 4 Several scholars have
considered the roles of various types of intellectual property as
complements or alternatives to other appropriation mechanisms
like lead time, secrecy, and contract. 5 There is a cottage industry
of research studying the so-called negative spaces--contexts and
communities within which norms govern creative and innovative
behavior more strongly than do formal IP rules. 6
A different line of work deals with the comparative
advantages or disadvantages of certain institutions within the
existing intellectual property framework-asking whether courts,
Congress, or some government agency should make certain kinds
of decisions or certain modifications to existing law; 7 what roles
state and local regulations or institutions can play in innovation
(2009) (examining and critiquing the United States's uniform approach to patent and
copyright law).
2.
See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 172,
175, 179 (2003); Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and
Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 449-51 (2016); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property
Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1025, 1034 (2014).
3.
See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of
U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 382-85 (2000); Daniel J. Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEx. L. REV. 303, 311, 32326 (2013); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference
to Climate Change), 62 EMORYL.J. 1087, 1101, 1119-20 (2013).
4.
See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2019).
5.
See id. at 12; Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257, 1267 (2004); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 262 (2012); Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1303 (1996).
6.
See David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2012); David Fagundes & Aaron
Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1313, 1327 (2019); Aaron Perzanowski,
Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 550 (2013); Zahr K. Said, Craft Beer and The
Rising Tide Effect: An Empirical Study of Sharing and Collaboration Among Seattle's Craft
Breweries, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355, 395-97 (2019).
7.
See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of
Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1566----68 (2016); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K.
Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law,
95 GEO. L.J. 269, 309-12 (2007); Sapna Kumar, Patent Court Speci,alization, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 2511, 2519-26 (2019); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1065-74 (2003).
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policy; 8 whether certain tasks traditionally performed by
government agencies should be privatized; 9 what should be the
roles of different government agencies in drug development or
other health care policy; 10 and whether certain questions of patent
validity should be adjudicated in administrative challenges before
the Patent Trial & Appeal Board or as part of patent infringement
litigation in federal district court. 11 Yet other work compares the
various institutions of intellectual property law to each otherevaluating the role of patent, copyright, and trademark laws in
achieving certain ends. 12
As this partial catalog demonstrates, one reason it is hard to
describe comparative institutional analysis with much specificity
is the openness of the concept of an "institution." These studies
variously refer to government and market actors, legal rights and
private ordering mechanisms, and even particular legal regimes
as relevant "institutions." All of these fit within the broad
definition of "institution" typically used by institutional
economics, which includes any structure or mechanism that
governs the behavior of a set of individuals. 13 This doesn't make
8.
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of
State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California's
Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1196, 1198 (2006); Camilla A. Hrdy,
Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1334 (2016); Camilla A
Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV.
487, 498-505 (2013).
9.
See Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 392-95 (2009).
10.
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 350-56 (2007); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating BlackBox Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 451 (2017); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance:
Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 171-72
(2016).
11.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2015); Saurabh
Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 51-55 (2016).
12.
See generally, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco et al., Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J.
75 (2018) (arguing that the segmented IP doctrines (design patents, utility patents,
copyrights, etc.) result in costly screens that frustrate the creative purpose of IP); Colleen
V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 Hous. L. REV. 325, 354-57 (2012) (noting a
disconnect between traditional patents and software patents and recommending reforms
within the software industry); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 Hous. L. REV. 823
(2012) (critiquing the inconsistencies of the so-called functionality doctrine within
trademark law); Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611
(2013) (isolating the differences in copyright and patent law); Gideon Parchomovsky &
Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV.
1455 (2002) (advocating for the integration of traditionally separate IP segments); Pamela
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2017) (identifying the costs that accompany imprecise
separation of copyright and patent law).
13.
See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3-10 (1990).
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the concept of institutions meaningless, but it does mean that the
field of study is a much larger one than intellectual property
scholars often appreciate.
In this Article we identify and seek to remedy two
shortcomings of the existing body of research. 14 First, we criticize
ambiguity in normative baselines, by which we mean the
objectives, values or ends ultimately driving evaluation. Second,
we criticize myopia in the analysis of social dilemmas, and
particularly an inappropriately narrow focus on market failures.
While we aim our criticisms constructively at comparative
institutional analysis in IP, both apply more generally.
Persistent ambiguity about the proper normative baseline
infects IP scholarship. 15 Comparative institutional analyses often
presume some objective and evaluate different institutions in
terms of their ability to accomplish that objective. Sometimes,
analysts explicitly identify the objective (for example, increased
economic growth); other times, the objective is implied (for
example, the analyst describes outcomes as ''better" or "worse,"
presumably in terms of social welfare). But however clearly (or
not) the objectives are identified, in many cases they are not
defended, at least not as against other possible objectives.
More generally, the various comparative institutional
analyses lack a common objective, or at least an objective
described at a common level of generality. This makes it difficultperhaps impossible-to aggregate comparative institutional
analyses or to compare them to each other. Given the range of
different possible normative justifications for different innovation
regimes, it may not be possible for comparative institutional
analysis to solve this problem. We can, however, ask at least for
greater transparency about the underlying normative premises.
We offer a tentative suggestion to address this issue.
Specifically, we propose that scenario analysis can help bridge the
range of normative premises. Under this approach, the analyst
14.
A third shortcoming that we do not seek to address in this Article is the lack of a
shared methodology or framework for comparative analysis in this context. Simply put, it
is incredibly difficult to put the various studies together and learn from them. Yet surely
that must be an important goal for the community of scholars doing the comparative work.
One of us is currently involved with the development and use of a framework for
institutional analysis for studying knowledge commons. Brett M. Frischmann et al.,
Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 10---11
(Frischmann et al. eds., 2014); Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and
the Road to Medical Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1
(Katherine J. Strandburg et al. eds., 2016). There are close affinities between that project
and this one, but we do not pursue them here.
15.
It is possible that there is no ambiguity and that normative baselines are simply
embedded, but undefended, and perhaps ultimately simply assumed.
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would consider a range of normative premises and evaluate
institutional structures in light of those premises. Particular
institutional arrangements might appear to be optimal across a
variety of different premises such that second-order agreement
might be possible. 16 Scenario analysis also might illuminate the
relationship between normative premises and institutional
arrangements by highlighting the ways different normative
premises lead to preferences for different institutional
arrangements.
The bulk of this Article is devoted to our argument for a more
inclusive approach that involves comparative analysis of failures
and institutions in context. We particularly emphasize the role of
comparative failure analysis in this process. We differentiate
failures that are a function of a particular institutional
arrangement (which we call system-dependent failures) and
failures that transcend those arrangements and affect a variety of
different types of institutions (system-independent failures).
We conclude with some brief applications of our ideas.
Specifically, we sketch some potential studies relating to shortsightedness and the concept of "progress," and we highlight a few
examples of existing work that we think serve as exemplars of
what we are advocating.

II. NORMATIVE BASELINES FIRST
Comparative institutional analysis requires careful attention
to the basis for comparison. What all of the types of studies we
have mentioned have in common is that they attempt to compare
institutions in their effectiveness in achieving some end. 17 That
end, however, is often either taken for granted, left unspecified, or
could be identified and described at such different levels of
generality that the end might as well be unspecified. Take, for
example, "Progress of Science and useful Arts," the constitutional
basis for patent and copyright law in the United States. 18 What
counts as progress in this sense?

16.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1741-43 (1995).
17.
We thus are focused on comparative institutional analysis that purports to
evaluate rather than just describe. We thank David Fagundes for reminding us that
comparative analysis can be purely descriptive without judgment or normative evaluation.
We are not focused on that category, however. See generally Frischmann et al., supra note
14 (developing and applying a descriptive framework for systematic study of knowledge
commons).
18.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

320

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:2

Much of the IP literature assumes that the constitutional
mandate should be understood in utilitarian terms, commanding
maximization of utility (or, sometimes, welfare). There are a
number of problems with that assumption. Despite all that has
been written about the Progress Clause, there is really no solid
legal evidence that the clause commits us to any particular
normative framework. 19 Utilitarianism is a plausible choice, but it
is just that-a choice. Casting utilitarianism as constitutionally
mandated has important consequences: it marginalizes
alternative normative objectives and stunts both normative debate
and comparative analysis of institutions across various objectives,
which we describe below. At worst, it precludes deeper
consideration of the range of objectives society might pursue
through copyright and patent. But even short of preclusion, the
utilitarian frame sets a strong default position, putting a heavy
burden on proponents of alternative, equally reasonable,
objectives.
Even if we accept that the Progress Clause imposes a
consequentialist frame, such that copyright and patent are
conceived of as means and Progress in Science and the Useful Arts
as the ends, we are left with precious little information or guidance
about what Progress in Science and the Useful Arts actually
entails. As one of us has previously argued,
Within the legal community, where we debate the contours
of the legal systems nominally designed to promote cultural
and scientific Progress, we know too little about that which
we seek to promote. We place too much emphasis on easily
observable
and
measurable
outputs-works
and
inventions-and figure the more the merrier. As Boyle noted,
the romantic conception of the author/inventor is intimately
connected with our narrow product-focused vision. But that
is only one of many possible paths along which our culture
may progress, by which our cultural environment may
evolve. There are others. We might, for example, imagine
Progress as measured by the degree of participation in
creative and inventive activities; participation in such
activities yields outputs, to be sure, but participation also
educates, builds human capital, skills, and ultimately may
unlock human potential. 2 0
"Progress of Science and useful Arts" is simply too abstract a
concept to serve as a baseline for evaluation. Indeed, any of the
19.
We make this argument more extensively in Brett Frischmann & Mark P.
McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 123.
20.
Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and The Wealth of Networks,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1095-96 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
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following understandings of "Progress" are perfectly reasonable
from an interpretive, historical, and normative standpoint:

A. advancement of the relevant knowledge frontiersscientific, technological, aesthetic, cultural, etc. 21
B. advancement in the distribution of existing knowledgemaking more of what is known by some, known to allframed in terms of education, human capital, or
otherwise 22
C. greater quantity of outputs-works and inventions (of
some types)
D. qualitatively better outputs-works and inventions,
subject to ambiguity regarding the criteria for judging
some outputs ''better"

E. broader participation in creative and inventive
activities-possibly framed in terms of education, human
capital, and/or access to the means of production23
F. increased social welfare, subject to ambiguity about the
meaning of "welfare"
G. economic growth
H. sustainable development
These objectives may seem only subtly different, but the variations
can matter quite a bit in terms of institutional design. Different
institutional configurations will better promote different
configurations of objectives. For example, we strongly suspect that
different institutional configurations would be necessary if we
sought to optimize (i) production of works and inventions, (ii)
distribution of knowledge, or (iii) participation in creative and
inventive activities. Yet the Progress Clause gives absolutely no
guidance about which particular objective or mix of objectives we
ought to pursue, much less prioritize. It is tempting to ignore these

21.
See Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making
of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376-85 (2017).
22.
See, e.g., Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
"Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing
the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 776-79 (2001).
23.
See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Farina, Anti-Innovation
Norms, 112 Nw. U. L. REV. 1069, 1082-83 (2018); Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Impoverished
IP 13-14 (BYU Law Research Paper No. 19-15), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3365290 [https://
perma.cc/9FF8-8QYQ]; Colleen Chien, Inequality, Innovation, and Patents 20 (Santa Clara
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-03), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3157983 [htt
ps://perma.cc/MCS3-7Z2U].
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complexities and simply assume that the Progress Clause refers to
one or another of these objectives, or simply to brush the issue
under the rug by hiding the ambiguity in a general claim that IP
should promote "innovation"-as if "innovation" were one thing. In
fact, claims that certain legal systems better "promote innovation"
are quite common despite all the evidence that has accumulated
about the differential effects of various policies across industries.
As Frischmann argued in a different context: "Innovation rivals
capitalism among modern American gods, and it is blasphemous
to question progress or attempt to slow down innovation and
consider which path society might choose." 24
We recognize the temptation to characterize the ends of
intellectual property or innovation policy at this level of generality
in order to make the analysis, but settling for tractability is hardly
a defensible way to settle such a complex normative question. Nor
do we think analysts can ignore differences in normative baseline
on the ground that normative analysis is beyond the scope of
institutional design or comparative institutional analysis. First, as
we explain further below, the normative question must be
addressed for comparative institutional analysis to be meaningful.
One cannot evaluate institutions without some sense of what the
institutions are supposed to accomplish. Second, while it is true
that the choice between different objectives is not itself an
institutional design question, the allocation of the decision about
which objectives to pursu~ffectively, the "who decides"
question-quite clearly is one of institutional design. 25
At the most basic level, the "who decides" question appears
settled because, in the context of IP, Congress more or less decides
the objective(s). 26 In theory, this means that the political process
should provide information about what the public needs, wants, or

24.
Brett Frischmann, Thoughts on Techno-Social Engineering of Humans and the
Freedom to Be Off (or Free from Such Engineering), 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 535, 538
n.9 (2016) (citing NEIL GAIMAN, AMERICAN GODS (10th ed. 2011)).
25.
See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 42 (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 31-32 (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS].
26.
Under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, this seems correct. The Court
will apply rational basis review to IP legislation and will not give substance to the Progress
Clause. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 329 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
217-22 (2003). Alternatively, courts might interpret the Clause to have some substantive
meaning that guides and/or constrains Congress. Read on its own or in conjunction with
the First Amendment or even other sources of normative commitment, the Progress Clause
could support a range of objectives, as suggested in the text above. See supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text.
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demands. 27 But there are plenty of circumstances in which courts,
administrative agencies, and even private actors necessarily make
judgments about objectives. This is especially true where Congress
assigns certain decision- making tasks to those other parties and
leaves those actors interpretive room. 28
Legal scholars are well-suited to engage in descriptive
analyses of legal frameworks and prescriptive analyses of
institutional designs given existing legal frameworks and some
external normative objective. A lawyer's expertise is, after all,
institutional design. Lawyers generally do not supply the ends;
they supply means to achieving the ends supplied by others,
typically by crafting institutional solutions to overcome obstacles
to achieving their clients' objectives. Lawyers' normativity makes
the most sense when they are engaged in comparative
institutional analysis and the normative evaluation is really a
comparison of means. That is, when a lawyer says A is preferable
to B, they are making a normative statement. But that normative
statement only makes sense (as a product of legal analysis,
reasoning, or expertise) when the lawyer is comparing A and Bas
means to achieving some particular objective, and the objective is
not itself up for grabs, ambiguous, or selected by the lawyer. 29
One way of dealing with the intractability of the normative
baseline problem is to engage in a variety of analyses that
expressly assume a particular objective and evaluate the
institutional arrangements best suited to achieving those
objectives. Rather than simply determining how different
27.
We raise at least two very difficult questions about societal needs/wants/
preferences/values:
First, how do we know what we want? Second, how do we learn to want whatever
it is that we want? Answering these questions requires considerable analysis of
the dynamic interplay between how we figure out what we want, how we manifest
our demands, who gets to do the valuing (or ranking of values), and how the
environment within which we are situated and the opportunities it affords
simultaneously enable □, constrain □, and shape □ our wants/values.
Frischmann, supra note 20, at 1095.
28.
In the landmark decision Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984), the Supreme Court held that, where Congress has either delegated
interpretive authority to an executive agency or failed to give explicit direction on the legal
interpretation of a statute administered by the relevant agency, the Court will defer to the
agency's reasonable interpretation of the organic statute. For an instance of an agency
action that interprets a nominative directive from the government, here, the President, see
Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2012). We leave aside for now a discussion
of how the systems in which these actors operate generate the information needed to make
these determinations of objectives and the various ways in which system failures might
distort the articulation of public needs/wants/demands.
29.
Indeed, absent comparative analysis, it is hard even to evaluate normative
claims. Not surprisingly, the basic "compared to what" question is a tried-and-true favorite
at faculty workshops.
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copyright regimes fare as means for promoting one or another of
the objectives we identified above, for example, we might do
better---collectively,
as
researchers-by
conducting
a
comprehensive series of comparative analyses of the regimes best
suited to promote different objectives. This might take the form of
scenario analyses where scenarios are defined according to
different objectives. 30
One can imagine, for example, one scenario (SJ) in which
Congress decides the public needs/wants/demands institutions
that meet objective A, scenario two (S2) in which Congress decides
the public needs/wants/demands institutions to meet objective
B, ... scenario n (Sn) in which Congress decides the public
needs/wants/demands objective Xn. And we might consider
scenarios in which the objective might be some function of A, B, ...
Xn, where the various objectives are weighted. Thus, one scenario
might involve an equal weighting across possible objectives or
even
complete
uncertainty
about
what
the
public
needs/wants/demands. 31 It may turn out that particular
institutional arrangements make sense across a range of
objectives, and that might allow us to draw some conclusions
without having to settle on any particular objective. Or it might
allow us to determine that particular institutional arrangements
make sense for a certain cluster of objectives, and that different
arrangements make sense for another cluster. This approach
would at least help illuminate the relationship between
institutional structure and normative goal-to see which
institutional design features are sensitive to normative goals and
under what circumstances.
There is, of course, a risk that this could quickly get messy
and possibly intractable, depending on the range of scenarios
analyzed. But we don't mean to suggest that every scenario must
be analyzed in any one study. In fact, conceiving of this kind of
scenario analysis as the broad framework for research should
enable individual analysts to focus self-consciously on particular
scenarios and frame the findings in relation to other similar
scenario analyses.
30.
See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 210-11 (2012).
There is a rich literature on the approach. In his book, The Economic Dynamics of Law,
David Driesen argues for the use of scenario analysis in various contexts, with particular
emphasis on environmental law where scenario analysis would supplement and/or replace
cost-benefit analysis.
31.
This is obviously akin to specifying social welfare functions. We recognize the
similarity, but do not commit to employing those techniques. For our purposes, it is enough
to recognize the apparatus that could be used and perhaps must be used in some contexts.
The comparative analysis itself is not dependent on these techniques. They are likely
complementary.
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Another related approach would be to group the studied
scenarios at different levels of micro-meso-macro context and
specificity. Consider the possibilities detailed in the Sections
below.

A. Micro, Small-Scale Contextual
These studies would begin with a clear, well-understood
context within which a specific objective is well-defined and
politically-acceptable. There might be some useful negotiation
over how to articulate the objective, but this process should take
place ex ante. For example, we might consider the context of drug
development and articulate the objective in terms of supplying
drugs to the public that deliver demonstrably large health-related
benefits (perhaps measured in terms of quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs)). 32 We could also narrow the agreed-upon objective,
perhaps to lowering the cost of delivering existing drugs with
substantial health benefits. Or we could narrow it even further to
focus on specific health problems. Thus, Brett might conduct a
comparative analysis of institutions aimed at delivering drugs
(health care improvements) to deal with malaria; Mark might do
the same with respect to AIDS; Kelly with respect to obesity; and
Maria with respect to autism.
Whatever the level of specificity, it is important to first choose
a defined, well-understood context within which we can identify a
particular objective that is politically-acceptable and perhaps even
politically-established. We can then engage in a comparative
analysis of institutions within that context and make some
headway in understanding how well different institutions serve
the defined objective. If multiple objectives are unavoidable, then
the scenario analysis suggested above might be necessary, but at
least it would be more tractable in the more manageable microcontext.
There are, of course, limitations to this approach. Working at
this level necessarily requires the analyst to bracket important
questions: Why focus on this context rather than another? Why
this objective? Why, to take our examples above, malaria rather
than AIDS, obesity, or autism?
Regardless, there are genuine advantages to these types of
studies. For one thing, they can at least be done in an open,
transparent fashion such that assumptions and choices can be
interrogated. When they are done well, these studies can provide
useful information that might be sufficiently close to the real world
32.

Sachs, supra note 10, at 186.
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that it can be practically useful and perhaps even point to some
politically feasible policy intervention. They might be particularly
useful where it seems very likely that something in the relevant
context will be done one way or another, such that the comparative
analysis will be relevant. And, of course, if these kinds of studies
are done as part of the kind of scenario analysis we described
above, we might be able to aggregate the studies and draw some
lessons at a higher level of generality.

B. Meso, Sector-Specific Context, with Somewhat More Generic
Articulation of the Objective
This type of analysis would begin with a well-understood
context that is defined in terms of a cognizable (industrial,
economic, technological, cultural) sector within which the relevant
set of intellectual activities, actors, relationships, and so on can be
reasonably well-understood. The analyst would then attempt to
articulate a well-defined and politically-acceptable objective for
that sector. It is likely that such an objective will have to be stated
at a rather high level of abstraction to accommodate the diversity
of actors and beliefs about what "success" (progress) within that
sector might entail. 33 In a sense, this is the sector's general
purpose, and in at least some situations, that purpose might
provide a satisfactory basis for evaluation. It might be necessary,
once more, to look for more concrete objectives and employ
scenario analyses. Or it might be useful to conduct a series of
smaller-scale, micro comparative analyses within the sector.
Of course, there are obstacles and limitations to sectorspecific comparative analysis. Some are the same as we discussed
regarding micro-level analyses-for example, why this sector
rather than another? Others concern line drawing and the
definition or delineation of sectors themselves-this is done
imperfectly already, however, and there would be no reason to
reinvent the wheel. One analytical concern is the extent of
spillovers across sectors, both in terms of the impact that
institutions in one sector might have on others and in terms of the
impact that R&D and other activities in one sector might have on
others. Obviously, this can occur at the micro-level as well.
Sector-specific comparative analysis at least reduces the
scope of the analysis and the corresponding range of objectives,
and it also may be useful for analytical reasons. Specifically,
33.
See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 271 (2015). Relatedly, we think it would be interesting to study

the beliefs of actors within the identified sector. What counts as success within the sector?
What is progress?
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comparative institutional analysis is likely to be more tractable
and manageable within sectors.
The pharmaceutical industry is a decent context for this type
of comparative institutional analysis. In fact, recent surges in drug
prices have driven scholars to evaluate how different institutional
arrangements might bring prices down without undermining
R&D, innovation, reliability, or other widely accepted industry
objectives. Michael Carrier, among others, has analyzed how
different combinations of patent, antitrust, and related regulation
potentially would work. 34 His testimony to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on "Intellectual Property and the Price of Prescription
Drugs: Balancing Innovation and Competition" is representative.
Though contested (for obvious reasons), his essential claim, based
upon his comparative analysis of past, present, and his proposed
regimes, is that a series of legislative reforms would bring prices
down (the primary objective in his analysis), curb industry abuse
of existing laws that were intended to benefit consumers, all with
little impact on innovation or R&D investment. In other words, he
claims to have identified a configuration of institutions that
constitute a (second-best) win-win across objectives that should
receive bipartisan support. 35 Other scholars, including Rachel
Sachs, have made similar arguments about institutional
arrangements for reducing drug costs and/or promoting wider
access. 36
C.

Macro, Not Constrained by Context or Sector, Framed at the
Broad Level of National Political and Economic Systems,
with a Generic Articulation of Objective(s)

It is tempting to conduct comparative analysis at a macrolevel and thus offer prescriptions with the broadest impact. But,
as is the case for meso-level analyses, for such work to be credible,
there must be a basis for evaluation, a broad but well-defined and

34.
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust
Framework, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44-4 7 (2017); Michael A. Carrier et al., Using Antitrust
Law to Challenge Turing's Daraprim Price Increase, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1398-1400 (2016); Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive fllegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 69 (2009).
35.
Professor Carrier does not claim he has identified the optimal first best solution
for promoting the set of social values implicated by the legal regimes he has analyzed.
Rather, he claims that specific legislation "on samples, settlements, citizen petitions,
product hopping, and patent thickets would make patients' lives better without affecting
innovation." See Intellectual Property and the Price of Prescription Drugs: Balancing
Innovation and Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
(2019) (statement of Michael A. Carrier, Professor, Rutgers Law School).
36.
See Sachs, supra note 10, at 176-77; Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement,
102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2335-36 (2018).
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politically-acceptable overall objective-one that is stated at a
high enough level of abstraction to accommodate the diversity of
actors and beliefs about what "success" (Progress) might entail.
There are a few candidates, including objectives framed in terms
of social welfare or economic growth.
These candidates have serious flaws. Most simply, in our
current historical and political context, these objectives can only
be presumed or argued for and justified. There is no basis for
concluding that the people (through the political process) manifest
a commitment to academics' construction of objectives (or social
welfare functions, etc.) framed in these terms. Indeed, our list of
understandings of the constitutional concept of Progress indicates
significant disagreement about objectives even among academics
focused on intellectual property and innovation. That such
disagreement persists suggests that the evidence for any
particular understanding is quite ambiguous and subject to
contrary evidence. 37 And that is just among legal scholars. In our
view, the way the political process manifests demand is simply too
coarse and distorted to provide any meaningful support for a
public commitment to economic growth or welfare maximization
as objectives for IP policy.
Still, in theory, comparative analysis under various scenarios
at the macro-level would be useful. That is, for the reasons
explained above, it would be informative at least to know how
different institutional regimes fared in various scenarios, where
the scenarios involve different objectives or weighting of
objectives. It might be the case that certain institutional designs
are preferable regardless of the scenario-or perhaps for a wider
range of scenarios than others. For example, a comparative
evaluation of different institutions (patent, prize, tax, and so on)
or even different designs for a particular institution (patent) as
means for pursuing different visions of Progress (economic growth,
social welfare, and so on) would be incredibly useful. It would, of
course, be wonderful to identify potential win-win opportunities
where a configuration of institutions fared well.
In The Wealth of Networks (2006), Yochai Benkler did
something similar to what we have in mind. Benkler conducted
comparative institutional analysis across a range of normative
values. He carefully analyzed commons-based peer production as
a provisioning system, in comparison with market-organized and
firm-organized proprietary-based provisioning. These provisioning
systems are, or at least can be understood as, macro-level means

37.

Frischmann & McKenna, supra note 19, at 128.
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that involve complex institutional structures. Accordingly, it
seems to us that Ben.Ider is engaged in comparative institutional
analysis at the macro-level.
In a sense, Benkler "supplies" the ends because he chooses
liberal political theory as the baseline. Some such choice must be
made. What we find most important is that he is explicit, wideranging, and substantive in his engagement with the normative
values. The normative values Benkler discusses include:
autonomy (Chapter Five), democratic participation in both the
political sphere (Chapter Seven) and the construction of culture
(Chapter Eight), justice and human development (Chapter Nine),
and community (Chapter Ten).
The normative thrust of the book is that the emerging
nonmarket production systems should be allowed, if not
encouraged, to emerge within the core of the information
economy rather than consigned to the periphery. The
dynamic changes to the technological and economic
conditions of the information environment enable nonmarket
production to coexist and in some instances rival market
production. Not surprisingly, dominant market players may
resist the emergence of nonmarket production systems for a
variety of reasons. Incumbents may see emergent systems as
direct substitutes or as disruptive technologies that will
enable new entrants to challenge the incumbents' market
positions. In addition, incumbents may see emergent
systems as "free-riders" that unfairly benefit from existing
proprietary systems. Finally, incumbents may seek to
control the development and emergence of these systems so
as to ensure a "cut" of the eventual benefits. The critical
prescriptive point ... is that society should avoid optimizing
legal, technological, economic, and other socially constructed
conditions-the institutional ecology-for the industrial or
proprietary modes of production. 38
Although Benkler might not have viewed himself as engaging
in comparative institutional analysis, the normative section of his
book reflects his approach to the macro-level institutional design
choice about which provisioning systems to rely on and support.
He did not argue in favor of one provisioning system to the
exclusion of others; to the contrary, he argued for design choices
that would preserve freedom for all rather than giving in to
persistent pressures to optimize the institutional ecology. 39 And
this final point highlights, as Komesar emphasized in his seminal
38.
39.

Frischmann, supra note 20, at 1117-18.
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 391-92 (2006).
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work on comparative institutional analysis, that the "who decides"
question is perhaps the most important and hotly contested
institutional choice. 40
To conclude this Part, we think it is necessary to begin with
the end(s) that serve as the underlying basis for comparative
evaluation of failures and institutions in context. Without
attention to the normative end(s), which we've described in terms
of objectives, comparative analysis is limited to a descriptive
comparison of the way various institutions function and the
consequences of those institutional arrangements. 41 No
comparative evaluation can be made because there is no basis for
judgment.
In our view, comparative institutional analysis loses
something as it moves from the micro- to meso- to macro-level of
analysis. Specifically, it loses relevance and connectedness to realworld systems, and it dilutes empirical information about what
actors need/want/demand. From a purely normative perspective-focusing on the well-defined and politically-acceptable objective
that serves as the basis for comparing institutions and failuresthe more micro the analysis, the more trustworthy it is. At the
same time, the more micro the analysis, the more open the analyst
is to being challenged on the limitations noted above: whether
generalization is possible, and whether prescriptions for legal
reform can be developed. 42 Those challenges, however, have more
to do with the biases of legal scholarship, since the best approach
may be to pursue a series of micro-level studies in order to develop
the knowledge base for analysis at the meso- or macro-levels. 43

40.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 25, at 42; KOMESAR, LAW'S
LIMITS, supra note 25, at 31-32.
41.
The Governing Knowledge Commons framework and collaborative research
agenda is, at this stage, primarily descriptive. Its primary aim is to systematically study a
wide range of knowledge commons, including various dilemmas, community objectives, and
institutions. The individual case studies tend to be at the micro-level, and some series of
case studies provide insight at the meso-level. See Frischmann et al., supra note 14, at 12; Strandburg et al., supra note 14, at 9-10.
42.
This triggers the various concerns over uniformity costs, which scholars who have
advocated some form of tailoring have dealt with at length. See generally Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) (discussing the
failure of uniform technology patents and calling for tailoring of patent to specific
industries); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1158 (2002) (noting that patent law is one area of many in
which there are "drawbacks" to "encompassing many types of subject matter within one
broad system"); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006) (discussing the problems of
uniformity cost in patent law and copyright law and the adequacy of legal institutions to
address them).
43.
Cf Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of
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Finally, as we explore in more detail below, the level of analysis
might also affect the relevance of different (market, political,
communal) system failures and institutions. There may be a
question of fit. Failures and institutions may vary across levels,
just as the objectives vary.

Ill. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAILURES AND INSTITUTIONS IN
CONTEXT

Comparative institutional analysis must consist m
substantial part of comparative failure analysis, by which we
mean rigorous and contextual comparative analysis of market,
political/government, and community failures. In this Part, we
first briefly explain why and then we explain how. The why section
explains the ways in which distorting myopia creeps into analyses
of institutions aimed at promoting innovation. The distortions
dramatically limit what we can learn from the comparative
studies. In the how section, we begin with a preliminary diagnosis
of failures and, in particular, develop the distinction between
system-independent and system-dependent failures. We then
discuss the relationships between institutions and these various
failures.

A. The Importance of Comparative Failure Analysis
Many different legal and non-legal institutions govern and
therefore shape knowledge production. The variety of knowledge,
knowledge producers, and systems with and within which
knowledge and knowledge producers and users interact make it
all too tempting to look for reductionist shortcuts. That is true in
general, but it is especially tempting when one undertakes the
task of comparative institutional analysis. The temptation should
be resisted for it leads to either what Demsetz called the Nirvana
Fallacy or what Ostrom critiqued as myopic allegories. 44 One easy
reductionist step is to focus on a particular dilemma-identify a
particular market failure, for example, ignoring or assuming away

Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881 (2016) (discussing the importance of
diagnostic testing to individualized medicine and the interplay between patent law, FDA
regulation, and health law to achieve broad results); Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 360, 363
(same).
44.
See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GoVERNING THE COMMONS 13-15 (1990); Harold
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969); Brett
M. Frischmann, Two Enduring Lessons from Elinor Ostrom, 9 J. INST. ECON. 387 (2013);
Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
Ser. U.S. 15181 (2007).
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others-and then compare institutions in terms of effective
resolution of the dilemma.
At the macro-level, for example, scholars tend to frame the
problem to be solved by intellectual property laws as a basic public
goods problem, which is often described in terms of the free-rider
allegory. 46 Simply put, because intellectual resources are public
goods (nonrival and (non)excludable), 46 they may be undersupplied
within markets. The inability to cheaply exclude competitors and
nonpaying consumers (free-riders) presents a risk that investors
perceive ex ante (prior to production of the good), and that may
discourage optimal levels of investment in production of the good.
Many analysts assume: (1) that the free-rider allegory
describes a normal rather than exceptional problem; and (2) that
underproduction can be solved only by government subsidy or
intellectual property-enabled markets. 47 Government subsidies
deal with the underproduction problem directly rather than by
constraining consumption. The government allocates funds to
research activities that yield intellectual resources, making
investment risks less important. The resulting intellectual
resources can be shared openly and freely without concern,
because the underproduction problem has been solved on the front
end. By contrast, intellectual property rights lower the costs of
exclusion, enable transactions, and mitigate the risk to investment
posed by free-riders. Intellectual property rights thus enable
markets to function more effectively in supplying intellectual
resources.
Unfortunately, both of the assumptions we identify at least
oversimplify reality. First, free-riding may describe a normal or an
exceptional problem-we simply do not know for sure. There is
insufficient empirical evidence to support a general macro-level
claim either way. Overall, the empirical evidence is quite mixed
and suggests the answer varies considerably by context. The
relevance of the free-riding risk is best evaluated empirically in
45.
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (explaining the traditional free-rider problem as manifested in
the IP context).
46.
We use nonrivalry (without the parentheses) because this characteristic is
inherent or fixed for intellectual resources, and we use (non)excludability because this
characteristic is context-dependent, is variable with the costs of exclusion, and can be
addressed through various institutional interventions. See BRETI M. FRISCHMANN,
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 254 n.1 (2012). For a
thorough discussion of public goods, see id. at 24-57, and for a thorough discussion of
intellectual public goods, see id. at 253-314.
4 7.
See Frischmann, supra note 44, at 398; Brett M. Frischmann et al., Retrospectives:
Tragedy of the Commons After 50 Years, 33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming Fall 2019).
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context. In some contexts, free-riding is not a problem to be solved
at all; in fact, it may very well be beneficial for society. 48 Second,
in theory and practice, the solution set is considerably more
diverse and nuanced than most analyses assume. Note how the
binary thinking frames the macro-institutional choice (market vs.
government) and leaves alternative provisions systems (e.g.,
commons) out of view. 49 Moreover, while this framing leads to
some convenient, compartmentalized divisions of labor between
government and market, it (all too conveniently) ignores a host of
complications internal to the market and government institutions,
which we discuss below as system-dependent failures. The
allegory blinds us to the various problems and solutions, and even
when it doesn't, it too easily subordinates them. 50
The concern about myopia is not limited to the macro-level.
At the mesa-level, we might, for example, want to use comparative
institutional analysis to examine the pharmaceutical industry. If
we focus on overcoming the potential undersupply of drugsbecause drugs are expensive to develop but cheap to copy-and we
attribute the undersupply problem to the risk of potential freeriders, we might choose one narrow set of institutions to compare.
We might, for example, compare differently-designed patent
regimes, prizes, and tax incentives. Our concern is not only with
the free-rider problem, however. If we identify the FDA approval
process (and specifically clinical trials) as the source of many of
the costs associated with drug development, we might be inclined
to compare a different set of institutions-for example, patents
and other institutions like prizes, grants, and governmentprovided infrastructure for clinical trials. 51 With regard to the
48.
See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 261-62; Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers
Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV. 801, 807-13 (2009); Brett
M. Frischmann & Mark A Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258-60 (2007).
49.
See generally, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 39 (discussing the effect of such binary
forces on the industrial information economy); Frischmann, supra note 44; Ostrom, supra
note 44.
50.
There is much more we can say about the distortions associated with this framing.
For example, it happens to work very well with the linear model of innovation-another
terribly flawed model that is nonetheless widely adopted because of its tractability. See
FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 271-74.
51.
This highlights another reason why a broader framework for comparative
institutional analysis is important: most existing studies consider only a narrow range of
alternatives. Sometimes the studies are constrained by existing alternatives. Other times
the analysis is confined because it can only be tractable within defined limits, and
particularly because alternatives are difficult to compare when there are few common
dimensions along which to draw the comparisons. Hence, while we see comparisons of
patents and prizes or tax incentives, we do not see (to our knowledge, at least) comparisons
between intellectual property laws and investment in music and art education as means of
producing greater or better creative output. We note this not to be critical, but to note that
comparisons are only meaningful as between those things that are compared, and it is
important to understand the limitations of any particular comparative analysis.
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latter, we might then determine that government funding of
clinical trials was best because it lowers the cost of bringing drugs
to the market and lessens deadweight as compared to patents.
That analysis might be useful, as far as it goes, but it would
ignore still other problems, such as the demand-side failure that
leads to under-provisioning of drugs to smaller or nonexistent
markets. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with
comparing institutions as solutions to the free-rider or clinicaltrial cost problem. But it is to emphasize that we can only design
institutions to address problems we recognize, and the risk of
myopia is strong in comparative institutional analysis because
introducing multiple institutions to compare seems to demand of
the analyst a corresponding reduction in the scope of problems to
which the institutions might be addressed.

B. Comparing Institutional Failures
Recall that in the previous section, we suggested that one
must start with a defined objective (end) and context (level of
analysis). Here, we assume that this has been done. In other
words, the relevant objectives (ends) are settled, even if only in
functional terms or as part of a scenario, and we're ready to
evaluate means. 52
We might begin with the biggest institutional choice question:
what provisioning system is the best means to that end? What are
the options?-Markets? Governments? Communities? Comparing
these systems requires recognition not just of the strengths of
different institutions, but also of the ways those institutions fail.
We use "fail" here capaciously-and particularly we mean it more
broadly than the type of "market failure" at the center of the
dominant framing of intellectual property. As we discussed above,
intellectual property rights are often described as necessary to
remedy a particular kind of market failure that arises because of
the public goods nature of inventions and works of authorship. 53
Specifically, inventions and works of authorship are costly to
create but, owing to their non-rivalry and non-excludability, easy
to copy and distribute at a price that would prevent the developer
from recapturing its investment. We certainly don't mean to argue
that this kind of market failure is irrelevant, only to highlight that
this is only one type of failure that needs to be considered.

52.
We understand that there are problems with neatly separating means and ends.
For now, we leave that aside.
53.
See supra text accompanying note 45; Lemley, supra note 45, at 1039-40.

2019]

INNOVATION FAILURES

335

As we discuss extensively below, some failures have to do with
the nature of the institution under consideration. Certain failures,
for example, will be common to government institutions; others
will be common to market-based institutions. Some failures will
relate to the nature of the task an institution will be expected to
undertake and not to the type of institution. Administration of
prizes, for example, depends on the administering entity's ability
to gather information about the desired output and the structure
and size of the prize necessary to induce that output. That is true
regardless of the type of institution that administers the prize.
Still other failures will result from the combination of the
institution and the type of task.
It therefore might be necessary, or at least helpful, to identify
preliminarily the system-independent failures (or dilemmas) that
will need to be overcome to achieve the stated objective. These
might influence the macro-level options and evaluation. Then we
can proceed to consider and compare the system-dependent failures
and institutional options.

1.

System-Independent

Failures.

Some obstacles to
achieving the stated objectives are a function of variables,
characteristics, or circumstances that do not depend on the
provisioning system. We call these system-independent failures.
Usually these failures are a function of the natural resource
environment or of human nature. 54 These obstacles might be seen
as exogenous to any particular system, although as we will see
that might go too far since the systems may mitigate or aggravate
the obstacles in various ways. 55 Consider three examples:
(non)rivalry as an example of a resource characteristic;
shortsightedness as an example of a characteristic of human
beings; and externalities that can be a combination of the two.
The first example is the rivalrousness of physical resources
and nonrivalrousness of ideas. 56 These resource characteristics
54.
Bear in mind that market and political systems are social constructs.
55.
We identify these as system-independent failures, using "independence" in a
much weaker sense than is often used in social science and mathematical contexts. In those
contexts, independence implies that the systems do not affect the problems. But, as we
recognize in the text, the systems may feed into or reinforce the problems, in ways large
and small.
56.
We tend to emphasize failures associated with nonrivalrousness, but
rivalrousness can be equally problematic. Whether the marginal cost of consuming
something is zero or positive, different complications may arise for suppliers. In a sense,
rivalrousness creates information problems-how much of a resource should be supplied?
To determine provisioning, one needs to know who needs/wants/demands how much of
what. Governments may struggle, and markets may thrive, in overcoming this problem by
use of the price mechanism, but reliance on markets for rivalrous goods creates demand for
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give rise to obstacles (even governance dilemmas) 57 that exist
regardless of which systems society chooses to rely on as means for
provisioning or governing the resources. Of course, the obstacles
may vary in magnitude or form across systems, and again, the
systems can be designed to exacerbate or lessen the dilemmas. But
the point is that the resource characteristics that give rise to
obstacles or dilemmas are not a function of provisioning systems.
Shortsightedness afflicts human beings, and it can be
exacerbated, controlled, or adjusted within any of the systems. 58
Political systems may be designed to extend or shorten time
horizons; the same is true of markets, of course. But the problem
of shortsightedness originates with individual human beings and
characteristics of human behavior and decision-making. We use
shortsightedness to refer to decision-making that irrationally
preferences the short-run over the long-run, or put another way,
decision-making that irrationally discounts the future. 59 One
could engage in shortsighted decision-making either by favoring
short-run gains over significantly larger long-run gains, by
choosing policies that generate short-run gains but larger longterm costs, or by avoiding short-run costs when the consequence is
more significant longer-term costs. A variety of psychological
biases contribute to the problem. 60 Shortsightedness constitutes a
system-independent problem because of its origins in human
behavior and because it distorts individual and collective decisionmaking regardless of the provisioning system. 61
a certain type of governance institution--exclusive rights to possession and use-without
which markets may struggle. Nonrivalrousness doesn't eliminate the information
problem-we still need to know what to supply and to whom, but it is different in certain
respects. This is not the place to fully describe the obstacles. Frischmann has discussed
them extensively elsewhere. See generally FRISCHMANN, supra note 46; Frischmann et al.,
supra note 14.
57.
Another way to frame this would be to say that the resource characteristics
themselves give rise to societal demand for governance.
58.
For a short piece on shortsightedness that begins with an episode of South Park,
see Brett M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and Intergenerational
Equity, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 457-60 (2005).
59.
We could discuss a host of behavioral economic concerns here. See generally DAN
ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (First Harper Perennial 2010) (2008).
60.
Shortsightedness is one of the examples/applications we will explore. See infra
Section IV.A.
61.
Here, again, we run into some confusion about our use of independence. Different
provisioning systems can mitigate or exacerbate shortsightedness, and thus actual or
observed shortsightedness is not independent of systems in the technical sense used in
mathematics or the social sciences. See supra note 55. A similar point arose in the old debate
about causation in which Ronald Coase observed that externalities arise from
interdependence and are thus jointly produced. See Brett M. Frischmann & Alain Marciano,
Understanding the Problem of Social Cost, 11 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 329, 332-41 (2014).
See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1961).

2019]

INNOVATION FAILURES

337

A third example is externalities. Although often described as
a type of market failure, this is a mistake. Externalities are
system-independent, at least at a rather fundamental level where
we examine what causes external effects to be external or outside
of people's accounting or view or decision-making process.
Externalities are, by definition, third-party effects; they exist
when one person acts in a fashion (or even when two people jointly
act in an interdependent manner) that leads to costs or benefits
that are not factored into the actor's decision-making process. 62 In
the context of markets, the idea is that an individual's willingness
to pay doesn't account for the external benefits or costs realized by
others. But of course, there is nothing inherent about externalities
that makes them more susceptible to full accounting
(internalization) within political systems. To the contrary, people
cast votes and otherwise exercise political power in various ways
that cause--or fail to account for-external effects. It may be the
case the markets and political systems fail differently or more
(less) frequently with respect to different types of externalities, or
perhaps that institutions within those systems are better suited to
dealing with externalities. And externality problems may be made
worse within different systems-e.g., relying on markets to guide
environmental resource allocation may systematically fail because
of externalities. But our basic point holds. Externalities are not
dependent on the provisioning system; rather, they are a product
of interdependence among people and resources.
Another resource-related, system-independent failure is what
Frischmann referred to as "innovative process market failure." 63
Though he erroneously framed the problem in terms of market
failure, the problem he identified was not dependent on the choice
of the market as the provisioning system. Rather, that problem
concerned the innovative process itself.
Innovative process market failure (IPMF) occurs when the
dynamic nature of the innovative process and its uncertain
progression press investors toward more applied research
than is socially desirable. IPMF has two defining
characteristics: (1) dynamic dependence, i.e., future
innovative progress depends on the existing state, and (2)
prospective uncertainty, i.e., risks, time horizons,
expenditures, and spillovers are uncertain as estimated ex
ante. Limited public and private investment resources
require a careful balance between applied and basic
innovation projects over time to ensure efficient progress.

62.
63.

See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 37-40.
Frischmann, supra note 3, at 374.
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However, in the face of prospective uncertainty, investors
skew innovation investment from the socially optimal
distribution between applied and basic research, irrespective
of public goods market failures ....
The social costs of IPMF are an interesting brand of
opportunity costs, rangmg from slowed technological
development
within
an
industry
to
significant
macroeconomic effects on competitiveness in emerging
industries. As commentators have noted, under-investment
in basic research will likely undercut the supply of new ideas
and, equally important, the supply of future avenues of
research. Moreover, innovative process market failures
interact with public goods market failures and the corrective
institutional mechanisms employed by the government. 64
Our reason for identifying system-independent failures is, among
other things, to prevent conflation with system-dependent
failures. Importantly, identification and analysis of the systemindependent obstacles will help frame the analysis of the
provisioning system choice as well as the subsidiary comparative
institutional analysis.
We need to emphasize again here that identifying a particular
failure or obstacle as system-independent does not imply that its
significance or magnitude is entirely independent of institutional
design. To the contrary, many system-independent failures can be
mitigated or exacerbated by certain institutional design choices.
The point is that doing comparative institutional analysis requires
recognition that these failures will be relevant across different
institutions, which should draw more attention to the ways
institutional design can affect them.
2. System-Dependent Failures. Markets, political systems,
and communities serve as means. These systems comprise the
rules of the game and structure the opportunities that people have
to act in pursuit of their interests. The systems don't exist
independently-they are socially constructed, whether designed or
emergent. 65 They are provisioning systems-systems through

Id. at 374-76.
See BRE'IT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 45-50
(2018) (discussing how systems depend on societies to construct their meaning). Consider
antitrust law as an institution. Its primary (perhaps only) objective is maximizing
[consumer welfare] [economic welfare] [social welfare]. To accomplish this objective, the
institution is designed to achieve an intermediate objective, the preservation of [the
competitive process] [competition] [the underlying operating system of the market]. In fact,
64.

65.
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which we are provided with the outputs we desire. But for these
systems to function as such, actors within the systems must also
be able to figure out what to provide-to assess social demand.
Markets determine how to match supply and demand through the
price mechanism; political systems achieve this matching through
elections and governance; communities through (generally more
informal) social interactions.
Market systems fail in certain ways, political systems in other
ways, and non-governmental community systems in still others.
Of course, there is overlap. But in terms of identifying the
demanded outputs, the systems rely on different signals,
information, processes, and so on. And in satisfying that demand,
the systems rely on different actors, distribution methods, and
relationships. We think comparative institutional analysis should
account for characteristics that vary at the system level and shape
both failures and institutions--characteristics such as demandsignaling processes, evaluative criteria (for projects or
investments or innovation), and basic capabilities operative within
different settings or systems. Failures and institutions obviously
do not correspond exactly, and we suspect that comparative
analysis of these and other characteristics will provide guidance
for continued analysis. Solid comparative analysis will require
theory and empiricism in tandem rather than in isolation from
each other. Comparative (failure and institutional) analysis is
necessarily contextual.
System failures-market failures, political system failures,
and community system failures--occur within each system and
are a product of the particular system. In essence, the failures
derive from societal use of the system as a means. For example,
markets as means depend on a particular architecture, basic
operating system, set of operating procedures, and so on. Perhaps
the most basic defining feature of the operating system of a market
is reliance on the price mechanism. This reliance has
consequences, and it causes certain failures, particularly as
compared to alternative systems. Demand-side market failures
can be understood as situations in which markets allocate
resources, structure relationships, and shape activities based on
consumers' willingness to pay. 66 Because willingness to pay is
antitrust law is tied directly to the provisioning system itself. The "who decides" question
at the macro-level is determined. Congress then specified the law in very generic terms, in
effect delegating to courts the responsibility for working out the institutional details. This
is another macro-level "who decides" determination. Within antitrust law, the comparative
institutional analysis focuses on doctrinal rules, presumptions, burdens of proof, and so on.
66.
This includes allocating resources, structuring relationships, and shaping
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sometimes not a good proxy for actual demand, 67 the market
system can underperform in achieving some specified objective
relative to another system. In prior work, Frischmann discussed
this in terms of social demand exceeding private demand, usually
because of external effects from public and social goods that are
not reflected in private willingness to pay, but this may be an
incomplete description. As Demsetz implied by the Nirvana
Fallacy, the analysis should be comparative; failure of one system
should be described and evaluated relative to an alternative
system.
Just as we emphasized above that characterizing a certain
failure or obstacle as system-independent does not mean that
institutional design is irrelevant, we need to emphasize here that
the consequences of system-dependent failures may frequently be
felt outside of that system. To take one basic example, failures in
the government's provisioning of basic infrastructure are likely to
affect market-based systems for providing other goods or services.
Thus, analysts focused on system-dependent failures need to be
attentive to extra-system effects.

IV. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES
In this Part, we discuss some examples that we would like to
explore as this project develops. For the most part, we have focused
on potential applications of our approach, in part by highlighting
some contexts in which others have already done work that is
consistent with what we have described. Here we try to fit these
applications within the typology we developed above, and we
highlight strengths of the existing work while identifying issues
for future elaboration.

A. Shortsightedness
In previous work, we attempted to lay the groundwork for a
broader understanding of the goals of intellectual property law in
the United States, particularly by arguing that there is room for a
normative commitment to intergenerational justice, which we
referred to generically as "intergenerational progress." 68 We
suggested that intellectual property law as an institution was not
as future-regarding as it could be, primarily because it relies so
heavily on the market, and the market is systematically
shortsighted. We regarded this as a missed opportunity because
activities based on demand derived from consumers' willingness to pay-that is, upstream.
67.
For example, "willingness" to pay may reflect ability to pay.
68.
See Frischmann & McKenna, supra note 19, at 123-25.
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the subject matter of intellectual property makes it particularly
susceptible to the promotion of intergenerational progress.
We began this project where that previous work left off,
intending to focus on the ways we could promote intergenerational
progress by altering some rules within the intellectual property
system and by increasing our focus on other institutions that
might be used to supplement intellectual property rules and
partially offset their shortsightedness. To accomplish this, we first
identified a particular problem-the failure of the intellectual
property system to adequately provision goods and services with
long-range or broader social value. We took for granted a
normative commitment to intergenerational equity, or at least left
a complete defense of that commitment to a later date. We then
identified a cause of that failure, specifically the delegation to "the
market" of decisions about what types of cultural, scientific, and
intellectual progress we want. 69 We therefore argued that
nonmarket
institutions-including
various
government,
nonprofit, and other social institutions-should supplement
intellectual property rules in order to provide the kinds of goods
and services we had in mind.
We anticipated building on that work and engaging in a
comparative analysis of institutions for
solving the
shortsightedness problem, and we still hope to carry out that
project. However, as we considered how to structure such an
analysis, we realized that we needed a broader framework within
which to conceive of our work. We recognized that
shortsightedness is neither caused by nor unique to, the market as
an institution. It is rather a consequence of a number of human
behavioral characteristics-hyperbolic discounting among them.
These behavioral characteristics afflict decision-makers in a
variety of institutional settings. They are system-independent
obstacles, to use our previous terminology. Nevertheless, we think
shortsightedness is exacerbated by the market, relative to other
mechanisms.
The challenge of a well-executed comparative institutional
analysis relating to the problem of shortsightedness will be to
define with greater particularity the kinds of outputs we want
69.
See id. at 124-25, 127-28. To be clear, we recognized that there is obviously some
logic to such an approach, and we do not deny that IP systems optimally designed to
facilitate markets would lead to progress and improve the welfare of future generations at
least in some respects. Our argument was instead that progress need not, and indeed
should not, be conceived of in linear, binary terms (more progress or less). Progress instead
should be seen as contextual, in the sense that progress takes place within a particular
information ecosystem, and the defining characteristics of that ecosystem shape the path
along which we progress.
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some provisioning system to provide, to evaluate who is in the best
position to make particularized judgments about those outputs
(and what signals they will use to decide), and to consider how
other institutions can be structured to ameliorate the
shortsightedness problem and the potential effects of such
institutional arrangements on the market actors in the
intellectual property context. Also, we think it will be important to
be sensitive to context here, for the shortsightedness problem (and
the problems attendant to its solution) will vary considerably by
industry or setting.

B. Neglected Diseases
Terry Fisher and Talha Syed are working on a book that
engages in a rigorous comparative analysis of failures and
institutions in the neglected disease context. Though we have not
obtained access to the full book (yet), some of the chapters are
available online. 70 The book builds from their published article,
Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing
World. 71
In that article, Fisher and Syed accomplished three things.
First, they identified a social crisis: "Each year, roughly nine
million people in the developing world die from infectious
diseases." Second, they developed a rigorous analysis of the
normative arguments in favor of a social and political commitment
to overcoming the crisis. And finally, Fisher and Syed identified
two "obstacles" to achieving this objective.
First, the majority of the most effective drugs are covered by
patents, and the patentees typically pursue pricing
strategies designed to maximize their profits. Second,
pharmaceutical firms concentrate their research and
development ("R & D") resources on diseases prevalent in
Europe, the United States, and Japan-areas from which
they receive 90-95% of their revenues-and most of the
diseases that afflict developing countries are uncommon in
those regions. 72
The first two accomplishments together are quite useful in
developing a normative baseline for evaluation and articulation of
a well-specified, politically-acceptable (though still contestable)
70.
See WILLIAM w. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 22-23, https://cyber.harvard.edu/
people/tfisher/Infection.htm [https://perma.cc/4ES8-P65X] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
71.
William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs
for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2007).
72.
Id. at 583.
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objective. With respect to the normative baseline, it still might be
useful to engage in scenario analysis where different normative
baselines serve to differentiate the scenarios. But they have
identified an objective.
The two obstacles are interesting in the sense that they are
system-dependent and, to some degree, institution-dependent.
That is, both "obstacles" really seem to be a function of having
chosen the market as the macro-level provisioning system and
further the choice of patents as the market-modifying institution
to determine or drive progress.
It is not clear whether the authors engage in a comparative
analysis of institutional options. Rather, it appears that they
examine different institutions almost independently, motivated in
part by the fit between the institution and a perceived problem. In
a sense, they explain the gains that society might achieve through
the use of particular institutional arrangements or reforms. But it
is not clear that this is done in a comparative fashion.
We look forward to the publication of their book and the
opportunity to further explore comparative research in this
important context.

C. Climate Change
Climate change is one of the most pressing dilemmas society
will face in our lifetime. There is widespread agreement that we
will need to innovate to deal with some of the many consequences.
Thus, we believe it is fair to say that there is a reasonably wellspecified and accepted political commitment to support R&D
investments in this context. We might state the objectives as
promoting the development and widespread deployment of (1)
innovation to reduce GHG emissions; and (2) innovation to
mitigate the economic and social effects of climate change. We
might articulate others, and we might articulate more specific
subsidiary objectives already encompassed by (1) and (2).
Moreover, social and political commitments or normative
objectives will depend substantially on the scale and community
chosen. ·
A comparative analysis would need to address a wide range of
failures and institutions. There are a host of system-independent
obstacles to confront, including several that we mentioned in the
previous Part: shortsightedness, the nonrivalrousness of various
environmental and knowledge resources, externalities of various
types, and innovative process failures.
We suspect that the choice of provisioning system may not be
resolvable; all available provisioning systems may need to be
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harnessed in certain situations. That is, there are likely to be
complementary roles for government prov1s1omng, market
prov1s10ning,
and
community-based
or
commons-based
provisioning of innovation that meets societal needs. It might not
be terribly useful to do a comparative analysis at the macro-level
because of the difficulty in choosing a provisioning system. But
such a choice might be more easily made in more specific contexts
with more concrete objectives in mind.
Josh Sarnoff recently published an exemplary starting point
for this kind of analysis. 73 Here is the abstract for his paper:
Huge amounts of money will soon be spent by governments
and private entities to develop technology to reduce the costs
of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and to deploy
new energy and transportation infrastructures. Incredibly,
we still lack any good idea of the best means of providing
massive amounts of government or private money so as to
promote the most innovation and technology diffusion at the
lowest cost. This Article seeks to support better analyses of,
and decision making regarding, the choices of government
innovation-funding mechanisms by discussing the limits of
current analyses and providing a taxonomy of such
measures. It also proposes future work to better analyze
what we know about these choices and their relative
effectiveness, and it discusses new measures to expand our
knowledge base, which include: (1) better tracking of
government innovation-funding inputs and outputs; (2)
better documentation of and self-conscious decision making
regarding funding choices; and (3) creating experiments that
go beyond existing natural experiments.
Sarnoff analyzes the comparative institutional analysis
literature that focuses on innovation and concludes:
[W]e do not know very much yet about important issues that
should inform our decisions. We do not know: what
government innovation choices have actually been made,
their results, and their effectiveness across a number of
dimensions; why we have made those choices; how those
choices might compare to alternatives; what factors
influence the comparative effectiveness of those choices; and
the extent to which those factors are driven by particular
cultural considerations that may be subject to
manipulation. 74

73.
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to
Climate Change), 62 EMORYL.J. 1087, 1087 (2013).
74.
Id. at 1106.

2019]

INNOVATION FAILURES

345

Sarnoff then makes three proposals, which he suggests
"would help improve evaluations of such choices and consequently
help government decision[-]making in the first stance." 75
These proposals are: (1) better tracking of governmentinnovation expenditure decisions and their outcomes; (2)
self-conscious and documented legislative and agency
decision[-]making regarding expenditure form choices; and
(3) controlled experiments that go beyond existing natural
experiments. 76
Sarnoff then develops a useful taxonomy of government
institutions: "(a) subsidization; (b) procurement; (c) direct
development; (d) constructed commons; and (e) product, process,
and market regulation." 77
Even though he does not engage in the comparative analysis
of failures and institutions in context, his proposals and taxonomy
would be useful in framing such an analysis. 78
In a series of reports, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has undertaken
sophisticated analyses of the relationships between technological
innovation and climate change. Some of these reports have
adopted a comparative institutional approach. In one such report,
the OECD examined, through a variety of metrics and models, the
potential impacts that different policies might have on innovation.
The OECD assumed that the policy instrument utilized would
have a different effect on innovation depending on the type of
renewable energy source. For example, feed-in tariffs might affect
innovation in solar PV differently than it would affect wind
energy. 79
In 2011, the OECD published an extensive report analyzing a
variety of "policy levers" that would encourage innovation in the

75.
Id. at 1116.
76.
Id. at 1107-08.
77.
Id. at 1116.
78.
Compare Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Taxation, Innovation, and the Environment, at 13-16 (Oct. 13, 2010), https://read.oecdilibrary.org/environment/taxation-innovation-and-the-environment_9789264087637en#pagel (a comparative analysis of failures and institutions in context), with Sarnoff,
supra note 73, at 1116 (Sarnoff's three proposals to help improve evaluations of government
choices to fund innovations and Sarnoff's taxonomy of government institutions grouped into
five categories).
79.
Ovan Hascic et al., Recent Trends in Innovation in Climate Change Mitigation
Technologies, in ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY: BENDING THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY
17, 37 (2012), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/energy-and-climate-policy_9789
264174573-en#page7.
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energy and environmental sector. 80 The normative goal was clear,
and the report engaged in a comparative analysis at the mesa-level
of national policy instruments. 81 The report distilled potential
policy instruments into five different "vectors"---different
components of existing policy instruments that could be used to
encourage innovation-and measured the correlation between
each policy vector on innovation. The five vectors included
stringency, predictability, flexibility, depth, and incidence.
Stringency referred to the ambitiousness of the environmental
policy target relative to the baseline emissions trajectory;
predictability to the effect a policy had on investor uncertainty;
flexibility to the extent to which the innovator was able to identify
the best way to meet the objective; depth to the incentives to
innovate throughout the range of potential objectives; and
incidence to whether the policy targeted the externality directly or
whether the point of incidence was a proxy for the pollutant. 82
Note that the vectors related obstacles to objectives, and the
comparative analysis evaluated policy instruments in terms of
innovation, which in turn was measured according to the number
of patent applications in selected environmental technology
categories across OECD countries. 83 The report indicated that
policy stringency was correlated with innovation and this
correlation was statistically significant. 84 Additionally, the
flexibility vector was important because the results of the study
indicated that governments should give firms stronger incentives
to look for optimal technological means. The authors concluded
that monetary taxes and tradable permit systems scored well on
most of the criteria. Nonetheless, the authors concluded that they
could divine no hard and fast rules and that much comparative
and contextual work remained to be done: "[A]ssessment of the
effects of environmental policy on technological innovation
requires a close analysis of both the characteristics of the

80.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INVENTION AND TRANSFER OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES 14 (2011), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/inve

ntion-and-transfer-of-environmental-technologies_9789264115620-en#page I.
81.
See id. Notably, the book also includes three sectoral studies of innovation in
alternative fuel vehicles, solid waste management and recycling, and green (sustainable)
chemistry. Id. at 13.
82.
Id. at 22.
83.
See id. at 27-32. While there may be some problems with the methodology-for
example, some would criticize using patent counts as a measure of innovation--our point
here is not to criticize or defend the book on those terms.
84.
See id. at 33-35.
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environmental policy framework and the technology areas which
it is likely to affect." 85
The OECD has continued to engage in comparative work, and
it has emphasized a greater need for research linking policy
regimes to target innovation that achieves a particular
environmental outcome. 86
Further work on the identification of the innovation impacts
of alternative policies is required. This will necessarily
involve modeling the links between policy regimes,
knowledge stocks, capital investment and specific
environmental outcomes (e.g., emissions) in a comprehensive
manner. The development of commensurable indicators of
policy regimes across a variety of emitting sources is perhaps
the greatest challenge.s7
Given the scale and scope of the climate change dilemma and
the potential role that innovation can play in addressing some of
the challenges facing society, the time is ripe for sustained
comparative analysis of innovation failures and institutions. As we
suggested in the Introduction, this is where we suspect the action
will and should be.

V. CONCLUSION
Scholars engaged in comparative institutional analysis are
poised to make significant contributions in the field of intellectual
property, or more broadly, in information law and policy. This
Article aims to help guide that analysis, so that the work of
different scholars can be aggregated and learned from.
We have argued that to do comparative analysis well,
analysts need to articulate and defend their normative baselines.
Comparison can proceed at different levels (micro, meso, and
macro), but there is important value in staying closer to the
ground. Comparative institutional analysis 1s necessarily
contextual.
We have also argued that comparative institutional analysis
must be accompanied by comparative failure analysis, by which
we mean rigorous and contextual comparative analysis of the ways
different institutional responses tend to fail. Engaging in that
analysis requires distinguishing between system-dependent and
system-independent failures, even recognizing that institutional
design can exacerbate or ameliorate these failures.

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 14.
See id. at 15.
Id.
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